5530 Final Project please read the attached document Page
RESM 5530 – Fall 2021
Looking at the Law Differently Assignment
Assignment Name. Transforming Information – Looking at the Law Differently
Introduction & Purpose. Sir William Bragg, a Nobel prize winning physicist, chemist
and mathematician, once said: “the important thing in science is not so much to obtain
new facts as to discover new ways of thinking about them.” This course introduced you
to new legal concepts, doctrines, and principles; touched on select legal theories;
demonstrated how the “Law” and legal concepts can (and should) be factor in strategic
decision; and hopefully propelled you to think in new ways about how the law applies to
managing risks in sports, recreation, and events.
This assignment starts with something with which you are familiar – the risk management
process. You will be provided a risk management process from another industry (the U.S.
Army) to see how the military thinks about managing risk when planning missions and
It’s logical to ask “what does another industry have to do with sports, recreation, or
events?” But try reframing the question: “can I learn from the other industry’s risk
management process?” Or, “what can I learn from how another industry manages risks?”
In other words, discover new ways of thinking about old things.
Assignment. Re-read the article “Knowledge, Creativity and Innovation.” Afterwards,
read Chapter 2 of the U.S. Army Field Manual entitled “Risk Management Process.” Your
assignment is to transform the first seven pages of the chapter from a risk management
process that pertains to the U.S. Army’s combat mission to one that applies to a sports
management, recreation, or events operation that interests you or with which you have
· Starting the Assignment. Select an area that interests you (“area of interest”’).
The operation or experience can be coaching a team or even coaching a particular
position; preparing for a professional draft; preparing for an upcoming University
Interscholastic League or intercollegiate conference realignment; operating or
managing a recreation facility; developing a fund-raising campaign for a nonprofit
organization; organizing a major event, etc.
· Develop an Acronym. Identify the potential hazards that are present in the area
of interest you selected and develop an acronym that assists in identifying the
hazards (like the army’s METT-T acronym). Your acronym must include an “L” for
law(s). In other words, you must identify at least one legal concept that applies to
your area of interest. (Think about the Chen v. MLB and Dallas Wave
assignments). NOTE: You do not have to identify all of the legal concepts, but, you
should be able to identify one or two. You are free to talk to each other or reach
out to me.
· Writing the Paper. To assist you, I have underlined words that are peculiar to the
Army and stricken through the word “military.” (I may have missed a few). Once
you have decided on the area of interest and created an acronym, one way to
begin writing the paper is to replace the underlined words with ones that are
Looking at the Law Differently Assignment
applicable to the area of interest you have chosen. Or, you may find that some of
the underlined words apply to your area of interest, for example, the word “leader.”
You can use the Figures in the material as they are or modify them; or, you do not
have to use them if they do not apply.
You can transform the seven pages any way you desire as long as it is consistent
with the intent of the assignment.
· Paper Format. In writing your paper, you can use the same format as the material
you are transforming or develop one that works best for you. It can be from 5-10
pages. Whatever format you chose:
o use headings as transitions;
o 12-point font;
o Arial, Calibri or Times New Roman font style;
o single-space, and only your product will determine whether it is too short.
(Meaning don’t ask me how short it can be).
Rubric. You will be graded on your ability to apply the material to your area of interests;
your ability to develop an acronym to identify hazards present in your area; whether you
incorporate “Law” into your acronym; and the organization of your paper. Again, you can
follow the format in document you are transforming. There are a lot of ways to complete
this assignment. Don’t be scared, timid, or worse – intellectually lazy. Be creative. Be
innovative. Be Transformative. Page
Risk Management Process
First reckon, then risk
Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke
This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk
management process. It illustrates the application of
each step to military operations through the factors
THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW
Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling
hazards to conserve combat power and resources.
The five steps of
risk management are—
• Step 1. Identify hazards.
• Step 2. Assess hazards to determine risks.
• Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.
• Step 4. Implement controls.
• Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.
This five-step process is integrated into the military decision-making
process as shown in Figure 2-1.
FM 100-40 provides insight into the context in which the risk
management process is applied herein. Areas of particular interest in
FM 100-40 include—
• Solving tactical problems (Chapter 1).
• The science and art of tactics (Chapter 1).
• Hasty versus deliberate operations (Chapter 1).
• The plan-prepare-execute cycle (Chapter 1).
• Basic tactical control measures (Chapter 2).
• The factors of METT-T (Chapter 2).
Execution and1 Assessment
Risk Management Steps
X X X
X X X
1All boxes are marked to emphasize the continued use of the risk management
process throughout the mission
Risk decisions should be based upon awareness rather than
mechanical habit. Leaders should act on a keen appreciation for the
essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from
conditioned response. Throughout the entire operational continuum,
the commander must consider US Government civilians and contract
support personnel in his risk management process. Hazards can exist,
regardless of enemy or adversary actions, in areas with no direct
enemy contact and in areas outside the enemy’s or adversary’s
Figure 2-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated with
Military Decision-Making Tasks
influence. The two types of risk that exist across the wide range of
Army operations are
is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of
the presence of either the enemy or an adversary. It applies to all
levels of war and across the spectrum of operations.
includes all operational risk considerations other
than tactical risk. It includes risks to the friendly force. It also
includes risks posed to civilians by an operation, as well as an
operations impact on the environment. It can include activities
associated with hazards concerning friendly personnel,
civilians, equipment readiness, and environmental conditions.
STEPS 1 AND 2
Steps 1 and 2 together comprise the risk assessment. In Step 1,
individuals identify the hazards that may be encountered in executing
a mission. In Step 2, they determine the direct impact of each hazard on
the operation. The risk assessment provides for enhanced situational
awareness. This awareness builds confidence and allows soldiers and
units to take timely, efficient, and effective protective measures.
STEPS 3 THROUGH 5
Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to
effectively manage risk. In these steps, leaders balance risk against
costs—political, economic, environmental, and to combat power—
and take appropriate actions to eliminate unnecessary risk. During
execution, as well as during planning and preparation, leaders
continuously assess the risk to the overall mission and to those
involved in the task. Finally, leaders and individuals evaluate the
effectiveness of controls and provide lessons learned so that others
may benefit from the experience.
THE FIVE STEPS APPLIED
STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS
is an actual or potential condition where the following
can occur due to exposure to the hazard:
• Injury, illness, or death of personnel.
• Damage to or loss of equipment and property.
• Mission degradation.
Hazards are sources of danger or risks due to enemy or adversary
presence and other conditions not due to enemy or adversary
capabilities. Hazards are found in all operational environments.
Combat operations, stability operations, base support operations, and
training present unique hazards for units involved in these kinds of
missions. Hazards are identified during the first four steps of the
military decision-making process:
mission receipt, mission analysis, COA
The ability of unit leaders and staffs to identify hazards is key. One
reality of today’s missions is that the aspect of a hazard can change
rapidly. Things of little risk initially can quickly become major threats
due to unforeseen natural or man-made events. Leaders should be
aware of this possibility. Complacency to the fact that existing controls
may not continue to control hazards in rapidly changing situations
should be viewed as a hazard in itself.
The factors of METT-T provide a sound framework for identifying
hazards when planning, preparing, and executing operations. When
applying risk management to METT-T during mission analysis,
leaders and staffs should look for hazards that affect both tactical and
accident risks. They must identify all hazards that may present
significant risks to the mission.
Leaders first analyze the assigned mission. They look at the type
of mission to be accomplished and consider possible subsequent
missions. Certain kinds of operations are inherently more dangerous
than others. For example, a deliberate frontal attack, because of the
associated movement, is more likely to expose a unit to losses than
would a defense from prepared positions. Identifying missions that
routinely present great risk is imperative. Leaders also look for
hazards associated with complexity of the plan such as—
• A scheme of maneuver that is difficult to understand or too
complex for accurate communications down to the lowest level.
• The impact of operating under a fragmentary order (FRAGO).
Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant
hazards to the operation. For example, “What can the enemy do to
defeat my operation?” Common shortfalls that can create hazards
during operations against an enemy include failure to—
• Assess potential advantages to the enemy provided by the
• Fully assess the enemy’s capabilities.
• Understand enemy collection capabilities and friendly
vulnerabilities to those capabilities.
• Accurately determine the enemy’s probable COAs.
• Plan and coordinate active ground and aerial reconnaissance
• Disseminate intelligence about the enemy to lower levels.
• Identifying terrorist threats and capabilities.
Intelligence plays a critical part in identifying hazards associated
with tactical risk. Intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB) is a
dynamic staff process that continually integrates new information and
intelligence that ultimately becomes input to the commander ’s risk
assessment process. Intelligence assists in identifying hazards during
• Identifying the opportunities and constraints the battlefield
environment offers to threat and friendly forces.
• Thoroughly portraying threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.
• Collecting information on populations, governments, and
FMs 34-130 and 34-60, respectively, provide detailed information on
IPB and on counterintelligence operations and multidiscipline
Terrain and Weather
In addition to those due to the enemy or adversaries, the most
obvious hazards to military operations are due to terrain and weather.
Terrain and weather affect the type of hazard encountered. When the
enemy uses terrain to his advantage, the risk is clearly tactical. The
aspects of terrain and weather may create situations where accident
risks predominate. When looking at this from a purely mission
perspective, familiarity of the unit with the terrain and its associated
environment must be paramount. Basic issues include—
• How long the unit has operated in the environment and climate.
• Whether the terrain has been crossed before.
The five main military aspects of terrain—
fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain and decisive terrain,
and avenues of approach (OCOKA)—
can be used to identify and assess
hazards impacting on friendly forces. Chapter 2 of FM 100-40 has
details on OCOKA. The terrain analysis includes both map and on-the-
ground reconnaissance to identify how well unit capabilities and
mission demands can be accommodated by the terrain.
Observation and fields of fire.
Hazards associated with this usually
involve when the enemy will be able to engage a friendly unit and
when friendly unit weapons capabilities allow it to effectively
engage the enemy.
Cover and concealment.
Hazards associated with cover and
concealment are created by the enemy’s ability to place direct or
indirect fire on friendly forces.
Hazards associated with obstacles may be accident or
tactical. They may be due to natural conditions such as rivers or
swamps or man-made such as minefields or built-up areas.
Key terrain and decisive terrain.
Hazards are a marked advantage
terrain provides to the enemy if he controls such terrain or
denies its use to friendly forces.
Avenues of approach.
Hazards associated with avenues of
approach can affect both tactical and accident risks. Such
hazards include conditions where an avenue of approach
impedes deployment of friendly combat power or where it
supports deployment of enemy combat power.
Weather works hand-in-hand with terrain to create
hazards. To identify weather hazards, leaders and soldiers must
assess the impact on operating systems. Mistakes include not
• Adverse effects of heat and cold hazards on the performance
• Effects of climate and weather on maintenance of vehicles and
equipment before beginning an operation.
• Hazardous effects of weather on the five military aspects
Leaders analyze the capabilities of available friendly troops.
A s s o c i a t e d h a z a rd s i m p a c t b o t h t h e s o l d i e r a n d u n i t . K e y
considerations are level of training, manning levels, the condition and
maintenance of vehicles and equipment, morale, availability of
supplies and services, and the physical and emotional health of
soldiers. Leaders and soldiers must be vigilant to the fact that hazards
in these areas can adversely affect a mission, even when all tactical
considerations point to success. Mission failure can be caused by—
Hazards to the physical and emotional health of soldiers.
sanitation facilities, water purification capabilities, medical
attention, and evacuation capabilities are key hazards that can
arise from incomplete logistical planning. Care of troops requires
long-range projections of all classes of supply, with close
monitoring of mission changes that could impact availability or
depletion of supplies. When beginning an operation immediately
upon arriving in theater, hazards include not implementing
measures to help soldiers overcome fatigue or acclimatize them to
the geographical area and associated climate.
Hazards to task organization or units participating in an operation.
Hazards include how long units have worked together under a
particular command relationship. During stability operations,
task organizations may change often. Hazards include poor
communication, unfamiliarity with higher headquarters SOPs,
and insufficient combat power to accomplish the mission.
Hazards associated with long-term missions.
include nation building, peacekeeping, or insurgency/
counterinsurgency operations. Hazards associated with these
missions include the turmoil of personnel turnover, lack of
continuity of leadership, inexperience, and lack of knowledge of
the situation and the unit’s operating procedures. An especially
insidious hazard is critical-skills atrophy that results from not
performing METL-related missions.
The hazard is insufficient time to plan, prepare, and execute
operations. Planning time is always at a premium. Leaders routinely
apply the one-third/two-thirds rule to ensure their subordinate units
are given maximum time to plan. Failure to accomplish a mission on
time can result in shortages of time for subordinate and adjacent units
to accomplish their mission.
The commander ’s legal responsibility is to consider hazards to,
and safeguarding of, civilians in his area of operations.
include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary
organizations (PVOs), US Government civilians, foreign national
civilians, the media, and dislocated civilians put at risk by military
operations. The commander must consider hazards that can occur
across the range of operations, such as—
In a wartime environment.
The commander must consider the
hazard of collateral damage which may result in creating
The commander must consider the
political attitudes and previous actions of civilians in identifying
hazards to friendly forces and the populace itself.
are hostile elements other than the enemy that may be
encountered during any operation. They present additional hazards.
They may be organized opposition or individuals that challenge
authority. They may include such diverse elements as rioters,
criminals, rogues, or gangs that might want to harass a peace
STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS
Step 2 completes the risk assessment. Risk is the chance of hazard
or bad consequences. This step examines each hazard in terms of
probability and severity to determine the risk level of one or more
hazardous incidents that can result from exposure to the hazard. This
step is conducted during three steps of the military decision-making
mission analysis, COA development,
step is also conducted after controls are developed.
The incident must be credible in that it must have a reasonable
expectation of happening. The end result is an estimate of risk from
each hazard and an estimate of the overall risk to the mission caused
by hazards that cannot be eliminated. Leaders must also assess the
risk to civilians posed by the operation. They may need to assess the
operations’ impact on the environment. This step is conducted in
Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the
of a hazardous incident. The probability levels estimated for each
hazard may be based on the mission, COAs being developed and
analyzed, or frequency of a similar event. Figure 2-2 provides a
summary of the five degrees of probability. The letters in parentheses
following each degree (A through E) provide a symbol for depicting
probability. For example, the letter
FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced
Single item Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur
several times over duration of a specific mission or
operation. Always occurs.
Fleet or inventory of
Occurs continuously during a specific mission or
operation, or over a service life.
Individual soldier Occurs very often in career. Expected to occur several
times during mission or operation. Always occurs.
All soldiers exposed Occurs continuously during a specific mission or
LIKELY (B) Occurs several times
Single item Occurs several times in service life. Expected to occur
during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently
(regular intervals, generally often,).
Individual soldier Occurs several times in career. Expected to occur during
a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently.
OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically
Single item Occurs some time in service life. May occur about as
often as not during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
Occurs several times in service life.
Individual soldier Occurs some time in career. May occur during a specific
mission or operation, but not often.
All soldiers exposed Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes).
Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability
Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability (continued)
Substep B addresses the
of each hazard. It is expressed in
• Degree of injury or illness.
• Loss of or damage to equipment or property.
• Environmental damage.
• Other mission-impairing factors such as lost combat power.
The degree of severity estimated for each hazard may be based on
knowledge of the results of similar past events. Figure 2-3 provides a
of the four degrees of hazard severity. The
in parentheses following each degree (I through IV) provide a
convenient symbol for depicting severity. For example,
degree of severity.
SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time
Single item Occurs in service life, but only remotely possible. Not
expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur some time
in service life, but rarely. Usually does not occur.
Individual soldier Occurs as isolated incident during a career. Remotely
possible, but not expected to occur during a specific
mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated
UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible
Single item Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost
never occur in service life. Can assume will not occur
during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of
Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents
may occur over service life.
Individual soldier Occurrence not impossible, but may assume will not occur
in career or during a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed Occurs very rarely, but not impossible.
Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or
mission failure. Death or permanent total
disability (accident risk). Loss of major or
mission-critical system or equipment. Major
p r o p e r t y ( f a c i l i t y ) d a m a g e . S e v e r e
environmental damage. Mission-critical
security failure. Unacceptable collateral
Significantly (severely) degraded mission
capability or unit readiness. Permanent
partial disability, temporary total disability
exceeding 3 months time (accident risk).
Extensive (major) damage to equipment or
systems. Significant damage to property or
t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . S e c u r i t y f a i l u r e .
Significant collateral damage.
Degraded mission capability or unit
readiness. Minor damage to equipment or
systems, property, or the environment. Lost
day due to injury or illness not exceeding 3
months (accident risk). Minor damage to
property or the environment.
Little or no adverse impact on mission
capability. First aid or minor medical
treatment (accident risk). Slight equipment
or system damage, but fully functional and
s e r v i c e a bl e. L i t t l e o r n o p r o p e r t y o r
Figure 2-3. Hazard Severity
In this substep leaders and staffs expand what they understand
about probable hazardous incidents into estimates of levels of risk for
each identified hazard and an estimate of the overall risk for the
operation. Estimating risk follows from examining the outcomes of
Substeps A and B; that is, both the probability and severity of
hazardous incidents. This substep is more art than science. Much
depends on the use of historical lessons learned, intuitive analysis,
Risk Assessment Matrix
Extremely High Risk
experience, and judgment. Uncertainty can arise in the assessment of
both the probability and severity of a hazardous incident. Uncertainty
results from unknowns about a situation; from incomplete, inaccurate,
undependable, or contradictory information; and from unforeseen
circumstances. Therefore, assessment of risk requires good judgment.
Figure 2-4 is a standardized matrix that can be used to assist in this
process. Leaders and staffs enter the estimated degree of severity and
probability for each hazard in Substeps A and B from the severity row
and probability column, respectively. The point where the severity
row and probability column intersect defines the level of risk. For
example, if the hazard is estimated to have a
severity (II) and a
probability (B), the level of risk is high (H).
Figure 2-5 provides a summary of the levels of risk. It also
provides examples of hazardous incidents for each risk level. Several
examples illustrate the trade-off between tactical and accident risks.
Figure 2-4. Risk Assessment Matrix
E – E x t r e m e l y H i g h :
Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazardsoccur during mission. A
or likely probability of catastrophic loss(IA or IB) or
loss (IIA) exists.
E x a m p l e :
A commander finds that one of his implied tasks to attack anobjective involves crossing a normally shallow riverbed. After looking at
the factors of METT-T, he discovers that three days of intense rain have
raised the water level to rise above flood stage, with currents far in
excess of his ability to safely ford with armored vehicles. After
discussing COAs with his staff, he determines the accident risk is
extremely high because of the likely probability and catastrophic
severity of losing vehicles and killing soldiers. His conclusions are
based on his experience with and knowledge of fording armored
vehicles under the existing conditions of water depth and current
H – H i g h :
Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of therequired mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the
mission, or inability to complete the mission to standard if hazards
occur during the mission.
probability ofcatastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A
probabilityexists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring.
losses (IIIA) exists.
E x a m p l e :
During a preplanned ambush, the leader discovers that theforce he intends to ambush has significantly more combat power than
his own force can accommodate. He realizes that he could only delay
rather than destroy the enemy. He knows his casualty estimates would
be very high if the enemy reorganized and counterattacked. He also
knows that the size of the enemy force could seriously impact adjacent
units conducting a movement to contact. He determines the situation is
because he estimates (based on his training and experience)t h e r e i s a l i ke l y p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e e n e my r e o r g a n i z i n g a n d
counterattacking and the severity of loss to his unit would be critical.
M – M o d e r a t e :
Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of therequired mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if
hazards occur during mission. An
probability of catastrophicloss (IE) exists. The probability of a
losses occur with a
(IIIB or IIIC). A
probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists.
E x a m p l e :
A commander in a defensive position receives a warning orderto be prepared to counterattack if the enemy attacks again. He chooses
to use pre-positioned ammunition caches to support his defense, as
opposed to moving his ammunition resupply forward by truck. He
determines that the severity of not having an immediate resupply of
ammunition available during the counterattack will have a
impacton his combat power. He realizes that if the enemy forces him to
abandon his forward positions, the severity of the loss of his
Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk
ammunition caches will critically impact his combat power. Heconsiders that his unit is deployed in excellent defensive positions. He
has repelled two attacks that resulted in the destruction of an estimated
50 percent of the enemy’s combat power. He receives information that
the probability of the enemy attacking is
, but that the probabilityof the enemy being reinforced and attacking in overwhelming force is
. The commander concludes that the risk of conductinga counterattack with limited ammunition is greater than the
risk of the enemy pushing him back.
L – L o w :
Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing themission. The probability of
(IIE), while that of
(IIIE). The probability of a
loss is likely or less (IVB through (IVE).
E x a m p l e : A mechanized task force (TF) conducting a movement tocontact in a desert environment is overtaken by nightfall before
reaching its limit of advance (LOA). The terrain along the axis of
advance is flat and open. Visibility is about 800 meters under a clear sky
illuminated by a full moon. Estimates put the enemy, which has been
hastily withdrawing for the past three days, at approximately 30 percent
strength. Contact has been light with no defensible terrain along the
TF’s axis. The TF commander considers all the factors. In addition, the
TF is 100 percent operational in using night vision devices. The TF
commander estimates that it is unlikely that his unit will incur losses ofcritical severity by being surprised by the enemy or lose critical combatpower due to an accident. He estimates the risk to his force